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SOME FORMAL MOMENTS OF TRUTH" 
B. Smith 
Correspondence theories of truth have. since the time of the Traclafu5 and of The Philo -
sophy 0/ Logical Atomism. fallen out of favour amongst logicall y minded philosophers. 
Theorists of truth have indeed normally avoided the issue of correspondence by averting 
their attent ions from the basic truth-relation be tween individual sentence and world, and 
concentrating instead upon logically structured sets of sen tences and artificially constructed 
set-theoretical models. In the present note I wish to give a brief account of some more or 
less obvious formal characteristics of this almost forgotten basic truth-relat ion. I shall then 
attem pt to show how this account may be extended to provide elements of a theory of truth 
wh ich is in keeping with the spi rit of the Tractatus. 
One principal reason why the correspondence th eory has lost so much of it s former att rac-
tion rests on the fact that philosophers have, in the last few decades , extended their interests 
beyond the narrow corpus of sentences for which the question of correspondence is most 
obviously appropriate, i.e. simple declarative sentences about the spatio-temporal world . 
They have sought instead to construct theories of truth which take account of the characteristic 
properties of sentences of other types, for example of mathematical or fictional sentences, 
of counterfactuals, or of sentences involving intentional or modal operators. Such experiments 
are of considerable interest, and they demonstrate the power and scope of set-theoretical 
semantics. Here however, in keeping with our more modest task, we shall restrict ourselves 
entirely to descriptive sentences like' John has a headache' or 'atom a (at some specific instant J 
strikes atom b', which are used to make assertions about objects or object-configurations 
in the real material world. 
Simons has argued that most, if not all such sentences are made true by entities which, 
following Husser!, he calls 'moments'. 1 Wittgenstein and Russell on the other hand saw 
the role of truth maker as being filled by specific kinds of complexes-states of affairs, 
or fa cts-complexes which may involve moments, but which manifest an essentially different 
ontological structure. The ideas sketched in the present note are in fact consistent with 
either approach and with a range of possible variants. We shall need to assume only that 
the relations which hold amongst truth-makers (be they moments, states of affairs, or 
objects of other kinds) are ontological rather than logical; that, in other words, such relations 
are radically distinct from the kinds of relations which hold amongst sentences, propositions, 
or other candidate bearers of truth. This assumption reflects a principle of the heterogeneity 
of logic and ontology, which has been formulated in order to forestall any too ready imputa-
tion of logical structure to the objects of the material world . 1 
The ontological relation which is most important for our present purposes is the relation 
of (proper or improper) part to whole. Thus it seems clear that if a makes p true, then 
every b which includes a as a part will also make p true. In symbols; 
(1) aFp-+'Vb(a~b-+bFp).J 
The relation ~ obtains only between objects (names for which occur to the left of the F-
connective). It has no analogue amongst sentences or propositions- in complete accordance 
with the principle of the heterogeneity of logic and ontology. 
We can now go on to affirm that 
(2) a F p . ..... p. 
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But the 
(3) p ..... 3a . a 1= P. 
also true? Consider. say, the sentence: 'Jack and Jill went up the hill ILe. not n .. c',.",,,, 
together)', or, alternatively: 'There were three eclipses of the moon in Erna's lifetime'. It 
would surely be wrong to assume that there are any single composite objects, events, or states 
of affairs-a Jack's running up the hill fused. mereologically. with a Jill's running up the 
hill, or a three-fold eclipse-fusion-which would make these sentences true. Rather we 
should accept, quite naively. that the given sentences are made true by a relevant manifold 
or plurality of truth-makers. Such a manifold is not a new, conjunctive entity. (It is not, 
for example, a set.) There are no conjunctive entities, any more than there are disjunctive, 
negative or implicative entities. A manifold is, rather, nothing more than the objects it 
comprehends; a manifold comprehending a single object is therefore simply that object 
itself. 4 
Manifold truth-makers may be represented by means of non-empty lists, 'a, b, C, .•. ,k', 
of names of individual truth-makers. 'r', 'A', etc., will be used to stand in for lists of this 
kind. 'a E r' will signify that r comprehends or includes a or, in other words, that a name 
for a appears as an item in the list' r'. We define the relation £' of mereologica1 inclusion 
between manifolds as follows: 
DI. r ~ A: = Va E r . 3 bE A . a or;; b. 
As possible axioms for the 1= -relation we might now propose: 
AI. r 1= p. -+ p. 
A2. p - 3 r . r 1= p. 
A3. r 1= p. -+ V A (r ~ A -+ A 1= p), 
(a generalisation of (1) above). A3. implies in particular a rule of thinning: 
(4) r 1= p. - V A . r, I:. 1= p. 
A4. (r t= p./\ I:. 1= q) -+ r, I:. =p/\ q. 
AS. (r 1= p./\p-+ q)-+ 31:. (A~r./\ A 1= q). 
By A3. and AS. we have: 
(5) (r 1= p. /\ p"" q)"" r 1= q, 
whence, in particular: 
(6) rl= p.'" r 1= pVq, 
from which we can infer: 
(7) r 1= p. V r 1= q. -+ r 1= p V q, 
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the converse of which we affirm as an axiom: 
A6. r Fe p q. ~ r p. r Fe q. 
By (5) we have: 
(8) r t= p t\ q. -+ r t= p. t\ r t= q. 
and by A4. we have also: 
(9) r t= p. t\ r t= q. - r 1= p t\ q. 
We can affirm as axioms: 
A7. rI=3a.p:-3a.rl=p; 
A8. r 1= 'Va. p : - 'Va. r 1= p. 
Logically compound sentences involving negation raise more serious problems (as may be 
expected within the framework of a theory constructed on the belief that there are no 
entities to which negated sentences or sentence-parts may correspond). S Wittgenstein solves 
this most fundamental of all problems facing a correspondence theory of truth by embracing 
two distinct types of correspondence. We have first of all the relation of direct depiction 
between Elementarsl1tze (all of which are positive) and states of affairs; and secondly a 
higher-level truth relation between sentences and facts. The classes of sentences and Elementar-
sl1tze, like the classes of facts and states of affairs, are mutually exclusive. Sentences are 
obtained from Elementarsl1tze by successive applications of the logical functions it is true 
that and it is false that. Facts are obtained from states of affairs by successive applications 
of the ontological functions the existence of and the non-existence of A fact is, that is to 
say, the existence or non-existence of states of affairs (d. TLP 2, 2.06, 2.062, 2.11). {; 
It would take us too far afield to provide a detailed account of Wittgenstein's theory here. 
We shall content ourselves instead with an approximation to the theory which can be con-
structed within the framework developed above. We define, first of all, a counterpart of 
Wittgenstein's relation of direct depiction, which we shall signify by 1=. 
D2. a 1= p : = (0 a t= p. t\ 
(ii) 'V q (a t= q . ..... . p .... q) . t\ 
(iii) 'V r (r t= p . ..... a ~ r). 
Clause (0 asserts that direct depiction (being made true elementarily) is merely one special 
case of being made true. Clause (ti) is intended to capture the immediacy of the relation 
1= between the sentence p and object-configuration a. It teils us that a proposition made 
true elementarily involves no logical redundancy or roundaboutness (thus no disjunctive 
sentence, for example, is elementarily made true). Clause (iii) signifies that the atomic object 
or state of affairs a which elementarily makes p true is a unique common factor of all 
truth-makers for p.7 Note that 1= is defined only in relation to atomic or individual truth-
makers: no sentence is elementarily made true by a manifold. 
From D2. and the axioms above we may infer: 
(10) a t= p. t\ a t= q . ... p - q. 
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that b '" p and c '" q. ) 
(12) a'F p. ;\ b ~ p. - Q = b. 
(13) a~p;\ bFp. -+ a~ b. 
The following now suggests itself as a possible definition of the concept elementary pro-
position: 
D3. elem (P) : = p -+ 3 a . Q t= p, 
whence by clause (iii) in D2., 
(15) pt\elem(p).-31a.a~p, 
--every true elementary proposition has a unique (minimal) truth-maker. 
In a fully developed system we should wish to recognise also theorems like: 
(16) a~ p. - "" E (a) 
--elementary truth-makers exist only contingently. 
(17) Q t= p. - "" p, 
a theorem whieh has no analogue for 1=. (Consider, for example, the sentence 'It is raining 
or it is not raining'. It is not possible that this sentence be false, yet it is made true-though 
not, of course, elementarily-by the relevant contingently existing condition of the weather.) 
And: 
(18) p t\ ""p. - 3a. 3q (a 1= q. t\ p'" q). 
But there are more radical extensions of the basic theory which suggest themselves. We 
might, for example, wish to consider the formal moments of the relations: is possibly true 
in virtue oj, is necessarily true in virtue oj, is made empirically probable by. and so on. 
And we might wish to consider the interconnections between formal correspondence theory 
and the characteristic issues of epistemology. These questions must however be postponed 
until another place. 
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